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HOW NICE TO SEE YOU AGAIN: THE REPETITIVE USE OF ARBITRATORS AND THE RISK 






The Federal Arbitration Act
1
 (“FAA”) permits federal courts to vacate arbitral 
awards “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them.”
2
  Interpreting this provision, courts have reached varied conclusions as to what 
biases, relationships, and misconducts constitute “evident partiality.”
3
  A prior business 
relationship between a neutral arbitrator and the victorious party,
4
 an ongoing legal 
dispute between the arbitrator and a party,
5
 a father-son relationship between an arbitrator 
and an officer of a labor union that was party to the arbitration,
6
 representation by the 
arbitrator’s law firm to a party in an unrelated matter,
7
 when the arbitrator is an officer at 
a company that conducts business dealings with a party that the arbitrator was not 
involved with,
8
 and when counsel to a party to the arbitration also represents the 
arbitrator in an unrelated matter
9
 have all been held to create evident partiality. Even after 
a court determines whether the particular facts create evident partiality, courts still apply 
varying standards on the disclosure requirements of the evident partiality.
10
 
Regardless of the exact applicable standard, actual bias may create evident 
partiality.  With increases in the rates of arbitration today, there is increased concern 
about potential biases and partiality.  The use of a particular arbitrator for repeated 
employment is such an example of such potential bias that may raise to “evident 
partiality.”  Parties, when choosing arbitrators, logically have an incentive to choose an 
arbitrator sympathetic to their position, thereby increasing the probability of a decision in 
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1
 The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012) [hereinafter the 
“Federal Arbitration Act” or the “FAA”]. 
 
2
 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2012). 
 
3
 See generally Lee Korland, What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose: Proposing a New 
Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2003) 
(outlining past decisions finding evident partiality and proposing that arbitrators should be required to 
conduct “a reasonable investigation” to disclose any potential conflicts of interest); Jennifer C. Bailey, The 
Search to Clarify an Elusive Standard: What Relationships Between Arbitrator and Party Demonstrate 
Evident Partiality, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 153 (2000) (discussing past evident partiality decisions and 
proposing a “reasonable person” standard in determining evident partiality). 
 
4
 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 
5
 See Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 
6




 See Close v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). 
 
8
 See Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 
9
 See Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs. Corp., 751 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 
10
 See Kathryn A. Windsor, Defining Arbitrator Evident Partiality: The Catch-22 of Commercial 
Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191 (2009) (exploring the split approach to determining 
evident partiality stemming from the Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth Coatings between the 
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit). 
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their favor.  It follows then that a party should be more likely to employ a particular 
arbitrator if that arbitrator has previously decided in favor of the party, theoretically 
making a repeated outcome more likely.  Therefore, this cycle may give arbitrators an 
incentive to favor a particular party if the arbitrator desires additional employment 
opportunities from that party in the future.
11
 
This incentive may be particularly strong in today’s consumer arbitrations.  
Consumer arbitration is a widespread means of efficiently determining consumer 
disputes,
12
 although it is difficult to determine exactly how widespread.
13
  Because 
certain parties, such as business conglomerates, that utilize consumer arbitration are 
likely to be involved in multiple arbitrations, arbitrators employed in consumer 
arbitration may be particularly susceptible to potential bias created by desire in future 
employment. 
Consumer arbitration typically involves a repeat seller and a consumer.  The 
seller, selling the product or service to multiple persons, may become involved in 
disputes over each sale.
14
  Because of this potential for multiple disputes, decisions 
favoring the seller could greatly increase the chance of future employment in similar 
proceedings for the arbitrator.  This incentive, potentially unknown to the consumer, 
could create an evident partiality requiring disclosure.
15
 
                                                 
 
11
 See generally Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 
121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2356-57 (2012) (discussing how “selection bias” of the stronger party in a mandatory 
arbitration setting may prejudice the weaker party by selecting favorable arbitrators or arbitration groups); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1650 (2005) 
(explaining that arbitration companies compete against each other for large arbitration contracts, potentially 
favoring the company in arbitrational decisions to keep the contract); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the 
FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214, 217 (2007) (“An 
institutional party, who chooses arbitration to resolve all disputes, may have an advantage over the party 
who may utilize the arbitral process only once, and only because his contract with the institutional party 
requires him to do so. In this situation, the party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator, 
creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
12
 See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1639 (“One recent study of the ‘average Joe’ in Los Angeles 
showed that approximately one-third of the consumer transactions in his life were covered by arbitration 
clauses” (footnote omitted)). 
 
13
 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 
235 (2008) (explaining that there is no reliable data measurement for the extent of arbitration). 
 
14
 Greater familiarity with arbitration of one party compared to the opposing party is known as the 
“repeat-player” problem.  See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650-51 (outlining that companies in arbitration 
have greater exposure to arbitration than the average consumer, and that there is some limited empirical 
evidence that the repeat player performs better than the non-repeat player); see also Lisa B. Bingham, 
Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 221, 232 (2004) (“Repeat players operate within a legal framework that affords opportunities to 
structure relationships and to set limits on liability . . . The resulting structure may affect the scope of their 
risk from a particular kind of claim or dispute.” (footnotes omitted)); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and 
Arbitration, The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and 
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1996) (outlining that a party that routinely engages in 
alternative dispute resolution may be at a strategic advantage because of greater familiarity with the process 
and being in a better position to draft the agreement, and therefore “garner the lion’s share of the potential 
befits for himself.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
15
 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rule 16(a), available at 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased (“Any 
person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any circumstances likely to 
give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any 
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This article will first examine the foundation, rise, and implications of the use of 
mandatory consumer arbitration.  Next, it will examine the foundation and current state 
of arbitrational vacatur for evident partiality.  Third, it will examine how repeat 
arbitration may be treated by current evident partiality standards.  Finally, this article will 
examine how application of evident partiality standards can improve mandatory 
consumer arbitration by offering a proposal for how repeat arbitration can be treated. 
II. THE RISE AND GROWING USE OF MANDATORY CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
A. Historical Roots 
Voluntary arbitration has long existed in the United States, dating back to the 
early Colonial period.
16
  Traditionally, arbitration was used as a voluntary method of 
solving business disputes between two business associates with greater expertise, speed, 
efficiency, and privacy than could be achieved through traditional legal proceedings.
17
  
Until recently, the use of arbitration was limited to business-to-business disputes, 
management/union disputes, or other disputes involving parties of similar 
sophistications.
18
  These voluntary agreements were generally supported by the courts,
19
 
and eventually codified with the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (“the FAA”)
20
 
in 1925, requiring all courts to compel arbitration pursuant to such voluntary 
agreements.
21
  It was not until much more recently that businesses began using arbitration 
agreements to require consumers, employees, franchises, and other parties to submit 
disputes to arbitration, rather than pursuing recourse through the traditional court 
system.
22
  In fact, this sort of compulsory arbitration seems contrary to the original intent 
of the FAA.  While deliberating the passage of the FAA, one senator voiced concerns 
over arbitration contracts being used “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captivate customers 
or employees”; however, the senator was assured by FAA supporters that the bill was not 
intended to cover such situations.
23
  Nevertheless, over the last several decades, a series 
of Supreme Court decisions have allowed businesses to do just that;
24
 and ever since, 
businesses have been able to mandate arbitration on both consumers and employees.
25
 
                                                 
financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship with the 
parties or their representatives.”). 
 
16
 See Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An 
American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 144-45 (2002) (explaining that arbitration began in the United States during the 
colonial period in order to avoid expensive court proceedings). 
 
17
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1635. 
 
18






 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
 
21






 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th 
Cong. 9-11 (1923)). 
 
24
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636; see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size 
Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 771 (2001) (citing the Supreme Court’s 
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Mandatory arbitration, arguably beyond the original intent of the FAA, first began 
in the securities industry.
26
  Since then, it has expanded into nearly every facet of 









 and education providers.
31
  One court has even gone so far as to declare that 
“[t]he reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and 
right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance 
policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is 
overwhelming to the body politic.”
32
 
The rise of consumer arbitration beyond the securities arena presents new and 
unique issues.
33
  First, unlike securities arbitration clauses, which are typically signed as 
                                                 
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), as allowing the use of arbitration 
to expand in an employment setting from less than four percent of business surveyed in 1991, to more than 
10 percent in 1995). 
 
25
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636 
 
26
 See generally Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636-38 (detailing the rise in enforcement of securities 
arbitration from the Supreme Court’s initial refusal to uphold investor arbitration agreements in Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), to the expanded use of accepted arbitration agreements in Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20 (1991)). 
 
27
 See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the borrows’ 
alleged inability to read and understand the arbitration agreement did not render it unconscionable or 
unenforceable, and that the lender’s failure to specifically inform the borrowers that they were signing the 
arbitration agreement after they learned of their inability to read was not unconscionable); McKenzie 
Check Advance of Miss. v. Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 2004) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause 
imposed on payday-loan borrowers even though there was not mutuality of obligation). 
 
28
 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (upholding the use of an 
arbitration clause in consumers purchase of termite extermination services as being within the 
understanding of Congress’ commerce clause powers); Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 
903 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause as part of the consumer contract for the 
purchase of tax preparation services). 
 
29
 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the use of an 
arbitration clause contained in the warranty brochure within the box on purchasers of personal computers 
that was binding unless the computer was returned within 30 days from delivery); Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. 
Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause in the “Acknowledgement 
and Agreement” section in the purchase agreement of a mobile home). 
 
30
 See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause 
imposed on a patient in the operating room); Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 
(Ala. 2004) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause on nursing home resident); Hogan v. Country Villa 
Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding the use of an arbitration agreement 
signed by the daughter of a nursing home patient who had been given durable power of attorney for health 
care decisions); see also Reed R. Bates & Stephen W. Still, Arbitration in Nursing Home Cases: Trends 
Issues, and a Glance into the Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 282 (2009) (exploring state trends in the treatment 
of arbitration cases related to nursing homes). 
 
31
 See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc. 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding the arbitration 
clause used by school in relation to claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Fallo v. High-Tech 
Inst., 559 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause used by a vocational school 
as neither procedurally unconscionable nor coercive); see also Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for 
Legal Reform of the For-Profit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 539 (2012) (alleging that for-
profit colleges are more commonly using arbitration agreements contained in enrollment agreements to 
protect against litigation). 
 
32
 Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999). 
 
33
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1640. 
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part of the document package required to hire the brokerage firm, many consumer 
arbitration “agreements” are formed without any formal signature.
34
  Second, securities 
arbitration clauses that are typically imposed at the outset of the business-to-customer 
relationship, while new consumer arbitration agreements are frequently imposed after the 
relationship has already begun.
35
  Third, the increased use of arbitration in non-securities 
transactions has exposed less-educated and knowledgeable persons to arbitration.
36
  
Finally, companies imposing arbitration on their consumers are increasingly using the 
arbitration as a means of limiting the abilities of the consumer to seek complete redress.
37
 
These new problems created by the expansion of mandatory arbitration into 
consumer settings has received mixed reviews from practitioners.  Critics of imposed 
mandatory consumer arbitration generally cite consumer welfare as the primary reason to 
be cautious of expansion,
38
 and decry that many arbitration agreements attempt to slant 
the arbitral proceedings in favor of the imposing party.
39
  Additionally, they argue that 
the unfairness of the arbitration agreements’ express terms is not the only problem, 
because empirical research has shown that arbitration agreements are rarely read by 
consumers.
40
  Furthermore, they contend that even when the agreements are read, they 
are often not fully understood.
41
  Some companies even go as far as to deliberately design 
the arbitration agreement to minimize the likelihood that the consumer will actually 
                                                 
 
34
 See id. (explaining that while the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be written, the agreements 
do not need to be signed; companies have imposed arbitration by including the “agreement” in documents 
that are rarely read by the consumers, including: “small print notices, envelope stuffers, . . . warranties 
contained in boxes or sent to consumers in the mail” on websites, and delivered via email). 
 
35
 See id. at 1641 (outlining that credit card companies frequently send their customers small print 




 See id. (outlining that, although not all securities investors are well educated, it is reasonable to 
assume at, on average, they are better educated than members of the general public; therefore, consumers 
presented with arbitration agreements in phone contracts, credit card contracts, and other common 




 See id. at 1641-42 (contending that companies are increasingly using mandatory arbitration clauses 
to “shorten statutes of limitations, limit or eliminate discovery, require a claimant to file in a distant forum, 
prevent consumers from joining together in a class action, or bar consumers from recovering particular 
forms of relief (injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, or attorney fees).”). 
 
38
 See generally Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1648-53. 
 
39
 See id. at 1649-51 (explaining that consumer and employment arbitration agreements can deter the 
imposed party from seeking recourse through the arbitrator selection, imposition of high costs, and 
limitations on the remedies afforded if vindicated); see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to 
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in the Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 33, 110 (arguing that submission to arbitration is actually a prospective waiver of a 
substantive right); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 675 (1996) (arguing that the imposition of 
binding mandatory arbitration is contrary to public policy). 
 
40
 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 




 See id. (noting that even if consumers have read adhesive contracts, they are even less likely to 
actually understand what they have read); see generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy 
and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002) (analyzing research showing that literate adults are 





  “In short, under most reasonable definitions mandatory arbitration is 




Proponents of the expansion of consumer arbitration, however, advance that these 
concerns are often overstated.
44
  First, proponents argue that adhesion is not unique to 
arbitration agreements, but is also commonly found in contract formation outside 
arbitration agreements.
45
  Second, proponents argue that consumers and employees have 
greater access to justice through the use of arbitration than they would have through 
traditional legal systems.
46
  Third, proponents argue that there is no danger in imposed 
mandatory arbitration agreements because courts strike down the few mandatory 
arbitration clauses that do overreach.
47
  Finally, proponents argue that imposing 
mandatory arbitration is necessary, because without such imposition, consumers and 
employees would never agree to arbitrate disputes postdispute.
48
 
                                                 
 
42
 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911-13 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (showing that AT&T spent 




 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1649. 
 
44
 See generally id. at 1653-58. 
 
45
 See id. at 1653; see also Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law 
(With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 200 (1998) (noting 
that adhesive contracts are a typical form of contract formation, and that arbitration clauses are also typical 
because it is just another aspect of the contract that the party is not fully informed of or aware, like most 
“boilerplate” language of the contract).  But see Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1653-54 (arguing that while 
adhesion is used in banking, insurance, and other areas, the substantive content of those agreements is also 
regulated by federal and/or state law). 
 
46
 See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1654; see also Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The 
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
559, 563-64 (2001) (using the metaphor that it is better for every employee to be given a new Saturn 
vehicle than a few select employees be given new Cadillacs in arguing for mandatory employee arbitration; 
“[a] properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better job of delivering accessible justice for average 
claimants than a litigation-based approach”).  But see Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1654-55 (arguing that 
arbitration does not guarantee better access to justice compared to legal settings because consumers and 
employees in arbitration are not guaranteed counsel, it may be harder to obtain counsel, there is no 
indication that there have actually been more claims in arbitration than there were in traditional legal 
processes, and it is improper to take away rights to the court systems and jury trials). 
 
47
 See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1655; see also Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration 
of Employment Disputes Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the 
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 119 (1999) (“Courts will only enforce arbitration policies that 
provide a fair process for the adjudication of employees’ statutory rights”).  But see Sternlight, supra note 
11, at 1655-56 (arguing that the Supreme Court has frequently limited the ability to apply state common 
law on unconscionability or fraud in voiding arbitration agreements, and that consumers and employees 
must overcome a higher burden of proof, that has been placed on the consumers of employees). 
 
48
 See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1656; see also Estreicher, supra note 46, at 567 (arguing that either 
plaintiff or defendant in a given dispute would favor litigation over arbitration because of their perceived 
position of strength).  But see Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1656-57 (arguing that voluntary postdispute 
arbitration is not impossible and often achieved in Great Britain). 
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B. Current Trends and Implications 
Regardless of the arguments for or against its use, the use of mandatory consumer 
arbitration is growing, albeit at an undetermined rate.
49
  Although the exact rate in the 
increase of the use of arbitration is uncertain, it is all but certain that the use of arbitration 
is now thoroughly pervasive throughout society.
50
  Indeed, “[i]t is not a hyperbole to state 




Despite the widespread use of arbitration in business-to-consumer transactions, 
there have been recent indications that the practice is not as common in business-to-
business transactions.  A recent Rand Institute study showed that more than 75 percent of 
consumer contracts contained an arbitration clause, while only 6 percent of their non-
consumer, non-employment contracts contained an arbitration clause.
52
  In the same 
study, companies typically voiced concerns over predictability in using arbitration in 
business-to-business transactions.
53
  Specifically, companies had concerns over increased 
trends toward the inclusion of litigation tactics in arbitration, making the process 
potentially more costly than regular litigation.
54
  These concerns may indicate that 
companies are more likely to receive a desirable outcome when using arbitration in a 
business-to-consumer transaction than in a business-to-business transaction. 
Whatever the reason for the increase in consumer arbitration, it is unlikely to slow 
barring a change in Supreme Court jurisprudence or congressional authority.
55
 It logically 
follows that as use of arbitration increases, concerns over selection bias likewise 
increase.
56
  More specifically, arbitration service providers such as the American 
Arbitration Association and the National Arbitration Forum compete against each other 
                                                 
 
49
 See Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 235 (explaining that there is no reliable data measurement for the 
extent of arbitration); see also Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1658 (finding that “researchers have found it 
very difficult to evaluate mandatory arbitration, for a number of reasons.”). 
 
50
 See Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 235-36 (explaining that the American Arbitration Association 
alone conducts over 100,000 cases annually, JAMS has an annual revenue of hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually, and the use of international commercial arbitration departments by law firms); see also 
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration 
Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (finding at least 
one-in-three of sampled business include a form of mandatory arbitration in their consumer contracts). 
 
51
 Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 236. 
 
52
 Douglas Shontz, Fred Kipperman & Vanessa Soma, Business-to-Business Arbitration in the United 
States: Perceptions of Corporate Counsel, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR781.html (last visited April 3, 2013). 
 
53






 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: 
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 52 (1999) (“If courts are unwilling to examine 
the reality of contract formation [in a consumer-commercial dispute setting], then the FAA may itself need 
to be amended to protect important rights of the one-shot consumer who cannot effectively bargain with a 
repeat play contractor.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 
56
 See generally  Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the advantages “repeat players” obtain over 
“one shooters” in the legal systems); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 55, at 34 (explaining how the one-shot 
player in alternative dispute regimes will be at a distinct disadvantage compared to the repeat-player who 
“controls virtually all aspects of the disputing process.”). 
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to provide arbitration services to companies for future consumer disputes.
57
  These 
companies are paid for providing such services,
 58
 and are more likely to receive repeat 
business if their client companies are satisfied with the prior services.  Similarly, the 
companies are more likely to receive repeat business if their clients are satisfied with 
their prior service.  Therefore, arbitral tribunals have a natural incentive to provide 
companies with “satisfactory” proceedings, because companies displeased with the 




Not everyone agrees with these charges of potential bias.  “[P]roviders and 
arbitrators vehemently deny the charge that they are biased. . . . Yet, critics maintain that, 
consciously or unconsciously, arbitrators may slant the result in companies’ favor.”
60
  
Despite denials by service providers, there is some statistical support to the charge that 
repeat-players are favored by the neutral arbitrator.
61
  Statistical analysis shows that 
companies who arbitrate a higher number of cases get consistently better results from the 
very same arbitrators.
62
  Additionally, individual arbitrators who rule in favor of firms 
over consumers tend to receive a greater numbers of cases from those firm in the future.
63
   
Beyond merely providing more favorable results, some institutions have gone 
further, promising to be more friendly to businesses and removing individual arbitrators 
who rule against companies in subsequent cases.
64
  “What is clear is that, because the 
decision to choose a biased arbitrator often holds few consequences and affords a 
company the opportunity to save costs on unfavorable judgments, the existing incentive 
                                                 
 
57
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650. 
 
58
 See id.; see also Cole, supra note 24, at 772 (“The arbitrator is likely to feel pressure to find 
in favor of the permanent party, the employer, in most cases because industry members will more 
frequently appear before the arbitrator.  In addition, in many employment arbitrators, the employer 
pays the arbitrator’s entire fee.  The sense that the employer ‘owns’ the process as a result may 
influence the arbitrator’s ultimate resolution of the case.  An arbitrator who regularly finds in favor 
of complaining employees may be certain that the employer will be reluctant to rehire her in the 
future.” (citation omitted)). 
 
59
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650; see also Cole, supra note 11, at 217 (“An institutional party, who 
chooses arbitration to resolve all disputes, may have an advantage over the party who may utilize the 
arbitral process only once, and only because his contract with the institutional party requires him to do so.  
In this situation, the institutional party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator, creating an 
incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor.” (citation omitted)); Cole, supra note 24, at 771 (“An 
employer using arbitration to resolve disputes has the incentive to compile information about potential 
arbitrators and their past decisions and develop a relationship with those arbitrators.  The former will allow 
better predictability of arbitral outcomes.  The latter will potentially allow the employer to influence the 
outcome of the arbitration.” (citation omitted)). 
 
60
 Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 55, at 53 (“[W]e do not 
actually know much about whether one-shot consumers do worse in merchant operated arbitration or 
privatized dispute resolution systems than they do in court or in other for a (or if they do nothing at all).  
We assume they do fare worse because we assume that dispute resolution systems chosen and maintained 
by one of the disputants therefore must benefit that disputant.  Why else would all these institutional 
disputants be defending their arbitration systems so vigorously against consumer legal attacks?  It is clear 
that such institutional disputants believe that they do better, and that such systems are cheaper and better 
for them than other forms of disputing, but we do not really know.”). 
 
61
 See Farmer, supra note 11, at 2357 (citation omitted). 
 
62
 See id. 
 
63
 See id. 
 
64
 See id. at 2357-58 
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scheme for arbitrator choice is unacceptable.”
65
  If this growing bias problem is believed 
to be truly unacceptable, one method to address the matter would be to implement a more 
stringent standard of review for evident partiality. 
III. EVIDENT PARTIALITY 
A. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.  
The basis for current standards on evident partiality stems from the Supreme 
Court’s 1968 opinion of Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
 66
  
In Commonwealth Coatings, the Supreme Court addressed the question of what level of 
impartiality is required in arbitration disputes.
67
  The Court held that arbitrational 
decisions required impartiality, but left open the question of what standard applies in 
determining whether evident partiality exists. 
Commonwealth Coatings involved a dispute between a contractor and a 
subcontractor regarding a painting job.
68
  The contract between the parties contained an 
arbitration clause,
69
 which provided that, in the event of a dispute, each party would 
select an arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators would select the third 
arbitrator.
70
  The facts of the case reveal that the third “neutral” arbitrator had previously 
engaged in consultations for individuals involved in business construction projects.
71
  The 
prime-contractor was one of the individuals, and regularly hired the arbitrator to conduct 
consulting work.
72
  Although the arbitrator had not been employed by the prime-
contractor for more than year prior to the arbitration at issue, the parties had previously 
been involved for four or five years prior.
73
  Additionally, the arbitrator had been engaged 
in business dealings involving other aspects of the construction project that was subject to 
the dispute.
74
  None of these prior business dealings were disclosed by the arbitrator or 
opposing party prior to the conclusion of the arbitration.
75
  Upon learning of the prior 
dealings, the subcontractor challenged the arbitral award.
76
  The District Court refused to 
vacate the award,
77
 and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
78
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 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 390 U.S. 979 (1968). 
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 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 150. 
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Justice Black, writing for the plurality,
81
 adopted the standard that evident 
partiality exists when there is the “impression of possible bias.”
82
  Under this standard, 
arbitrators must disclose “any dealings that might create the impression of possible 
bias.”
83
  To comply with the standard, arbitrators must disclose any connection, 




Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a separate concurring opinion to 
provide “additional remarks.”
85
  Justice White attempted to limit evident partiality to 
instances where the arbitrator failed to disclose relationships that had a “substantial 
interest” to the dispute.
86
  He opined that arbitrators should not be automatically 
disqualified due to the failure to disclose a trivial relationship, or because of a prior 
business relationship that both parties were aware of, but only where the arbitrator had a 
“substantial interest” in the underlying dispute.
87
 
Following Commonwealth Coatings, the differing standards of “impression of 
possible bias” and “substantial interest” created a confusing framework for evident 
partiality that necessitated a case-by-case approach throughout the circuits.
88
 
B. Reasonable Person Standard 
In 1984, the Second Circuit addressed evident partiality post Commonwealth 
Coatings in Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters 
Benefit Funds.
89
  Morelite arose from a dispute over the alleged non-payment of 
contributions to the Benefit Funds pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”).
90
  Pursuant to the CBA, the parties entered into arbitration.  The arbitrator’s 
father was, at the time of the arbitration, the Vice-President of the international union in 
which New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds (“District Council”) was a 
member.
91
  Morelite challenged the choice of the arbitrator prior to the proceedings, but 
                                                 
 
81
 There is contention as to whether Justice Black’s opinion was a majority or plurality opinion.  
Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994) (opining that “Commonwealth Coatings is not a 
plurality opinion”), with Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 













 Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring). 
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 Id. at 151. 
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 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). 
 
88
 See Ann Ryan Robertson, International Arbitration in the U.S.: Evident Partiality Based on 
Nondisclosure: Betwixt and Between, 45 HOUSTON LAWYER 22, 23 (2007) ([C]onfusion in the 
Commonwealth Coatings opinion gave lower courts little guidance, and most courts struggled with the 
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the challenge was denied by the District Court.
92
  The issue proceeded to arbitration, and 
a decision was entered in favor of District Council.
93
  After the decision, Morelite 
challenged the award, arguing that the arbitrator’s father’s position created evident 
partiality in the arbitrator.
94




The Second Circuit, after reviewing Commonwealth Coatings, concluded that 
“[b]ecause the two opinions are impossible to reconcile . . . we must narrow the holding 
to that subscribed to by both Justices White and Black.”
96
  As such, the Court held that 
the reasoning of Justice Black’s opinion must be treated as mere dicta.
97
  The Court then 
proceeded to examine the different standards offered by Commonwealth Coatings. 
The Court first considered Justice Black’s “appearance of bias” standard, but 
determined the standard was too low to create evident partiality.
98
  Likewise, the Court 
concluded that a “proof of actual bias” standard was too great, being hard, if not 
impossible, to practically prove.
99
  Instead, the Court adopted a “reasonable person” 
standard, finding “evident partiality . . . where a reasonable person would have to 
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”
100
  Applying this 
standard, the Court concluded that there was evident partiality, reasoning that “we are 
bound by our strong feeling that sons are more often than not loyal to their fathers, partial 
to their fathers, and biased on behalf of their fathers.”
101
 
Following the decision in Morelite, the Second Circuit again considered the duties 
of evident partiality in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve 
Sanaji, A.S.
102
  The Court reiterated the application of the “reasonable person” standard in 
determining evident partiality, but also created a duty to investigate.
103
  The Court held 
that if an arbitrator believes that a “nontrivial conflict of interest might exist,” the 
arbitrator must either investigate the potential conflict, or disclose why the arbitrator 
believes that there may be a conflict.
104
  Further, if the arbitrator does not choose to 
investigate the potential conflict of interest, the arbitrator must disclose to the parties the 
intent to not investigate the potential conflict of interest.
105
 




 and Sixth 
Circuit
108
 all use some form of the reasonable person standard when evaluating evident 
partiality. 









 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 81. 
 
95
 Id. at 81-82 (“Judge Cannella, noting that he ‘remain[ed] troubled by the relationship,’ nevertheless 
denied the motion.” (brackets in original)). 
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97















 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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 See, e.g., JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 
2003) (applying the reasonable person standard in determining whether the arbitrators being business 
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C. Reasonable Impression of Partiality Standard 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed Commonwealth Coatings implications on 
evident partiality in Schmitz v. Zilveti.
109
  The case involved a dispute that was submitted 
to National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) arbitration.
110
  Three arbitrators 
were selected to conduct the arbitration,
111
 and one of the arbitrators failed to conduct a 
conflicts check with the parties.
112
  The conflicts check would have revealed that the 
arbitrator’s firm represented a party company on numerous occasions.
113
 
After the arbitration, the party challenged the award on evident partiality 
grounds.
114
  The District Court concluded that an arbitrator need only disclose the facts 
that they are actually aware of at the time of the arbitration.
115
  Because the arbitrator was 
not actually aware of the conflict at the time of the proceedings, the District Court held 
that the lack of knowledge protected the arbitrator from showing evident partiality.
116
 
The Ninth Circuit overturned the District Court’s decision, holding that “‘evident 
partiality’ is present when undisclosed facts show ‘a reasonable impression of 
partiality.’”
117
  “Though lack of knowledge may prohibit actual bias, it does not always 
prohibit a reasonable impression of partiality.”
118
  Additionally, the court held that 
arbitrators may have an independent duty to investigate conflicts of interest.
119
  A 
violation of this independent duty can create a reasonable impression of impartiality.
120
  
The Court concluded that the arbitrator did have such a duty to investigate under the 
NASD Code,
121
 but because the arbitrator failed in this duty, the court found that there 
was a reasonable impression of partiality warranting vacatur.
122
 
                                                 
competitors to one of the parties to the arbitration created evident partiality, and concluding that the party 
waived the claim by not raising the issue during the arbitration). 
 
107
 See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(applying the reasonable person standard in determining whether the failure to disclose “attenuated 
connections” between the arbitrator’s law firm and the other party created evident partiality, and 
concluding that the failure to disclose was not a violation of American Arbitration Association rule or a 
demonstration of evident partiality). 
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 See e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the 
reasonable person standard in an appeal of an arbitration decision relating to a reinsurance agreement, and 
concluding that there was no evident partiality in the limited business dealings by the arbitrator with one of 
the parties to the arbitration). 
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 Id. at 1044-45. 
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 Id. at 1046 (citing Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
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 Id. at 1049 (explaining that “Section 23(a) & (b) of the NASD Code requires arbitrators to ‘make a 
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any’ ‘existing or past financial, business, [or] professional . . . 
relationships [that they or their employer, partners, or business associates may have] that are likely to affect 






IV. REPEAT ARBITRATION UNDER CURRENT EVIDENT PARTIALITY STANDARDS 
I believe that repeat player bias, regardless of the motivation, should constitute 
evident partiality under either the “reasonable person” or “reasonable impression” 
standard.
123
  Under the reasonable person standard, it is not required to show that the 
arbitrator is actually biased, the standard allows vacatur for evident partiality merely 
when a reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was partial to one party to 
the proceedings.
124
  The foundation to this conclusion does not need to be a provable fact, 
but can be based on the mere suspicions of a reasonable person.
125
 
Under the reasonable person standard, a contingent, future financial relationship 
between a party and the arbitration provider would seem to allow a reasonable person to 
conclude that the arbitrator is partial to the business party. The business party will likely 
be involved in more frequent arbitrational proceedings than the one-shot consumer,
126
 
and the business party will rationally seek arbitration from the same organization if prior 
results were satisfactory.
127
  Thus, it seems entirely reasonable that the arbitrator may be 
partial to the business party in order to ensure future business, and therefore in violation 
of the reasonable person standard to evident partiality. 
Likewise, repeat-player bias would constitute evident partiality under the 
reasonable impression of partiality standard.  The reasonable impression of partiality 
standard creates a showing of evident partiality when the disclosed and undisclosed facts 
about an arbitrator give rise to a “reasonable” impression that the arbitrator may be partial 
to one of the arbitration parties.
128
  This standard, like the reasonable person standard, 
does not require a showing of actual bias or partiality, but allows for evident partiality 
when the facts would permit a mere reasonable inference of partiality.
129
 
Mandatory consumer arbitration may also fall within this standard.  The less 
sophisticated consumer often does not fully understand the limitations and requirements 
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84 (2d. Cir. 1984)  (“[W]e are bound by our strong feeling that sons are more often than not loyal to their 
fathers, partial to their fathers, and biased on behalf of their fathers.”). 
 
126
 See Cole, supra note 11, at 217 (“An institutional party, who chooses arbitration to resolve all 
disputes, may have an advantage over the party who may utilize the arbitral process only once, and only 
because his contract with the institutional party requires him to do so.  In this situation, the institutional 
party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator, creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find 
in its favor.” (citation omitted)); see also Cole, supra note 24, at 771 (“An employer using arbitration to 
resolve disputes has the incentive to compile information about potential arbitrators and their past decisions 
and develop a relationship with those arbitrators.  The former will allow better predictability of arbitral 




 See Cole, supra note 24, at 772 (“The arbitrator is likely to feel pressure to find in favor of the 
permanent party, the employer, in most cases because industry members will more frequently appear before 
the arbitrator.  In addition, in many employment arbitrators, the employer pays the arbitrator’s entire fee.  
The sense that the employer ‘owns’ the process as a result may influence the arbitrator’s ultimate resolution 
of the case.  An arbitrator who regularly finds in favor of complaining employees may be certain that the 
employer will be reluctant to rehire her in the future.” (citation omitted)). 
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imposed by the contract and the arbitration clause.
130
  Likewise, it is unlikely that the 
business party would disclose whether it regularly conducts arbitration proceedings 
though the selected arbitration organization.  Such a failure to disclose would lead to a 
reasonable impression of partiality due to the inferences that can be drawn by the 
arbitration provider desiring a continued financial relationship with the business party to 
the proceedings.  Therefore, this impression should also constitute evident partiality 
under the reasonable impression of partiality standard. 
V. EVIDENT PARTIALITY, REPEAT ARBITRATION, AND THE NEED FOR THE 
COLLECTION OF RELIABLE COMPARISON DATA 
Currently, there are a variety of proposals for how to limit the impact of potential 
bias in mandatory arbitration.
131
  My proposal for how to treat repeat players for evident 
partiality purposes is to increase the availability of data related to the prevalence and 
outcomes of repeat arbitration.  Increased availability of data would allow for increased 




Using statistics to evaluate arbitration decisions is not novel.
133
  Recently, in an 
effort to collect data on recent arbitration proceedings, California passed a law mandating 
arbitration providers to publish certain data related to their administrated arbitration 
proceedings over the previous five years.
134
  The law requires that arbitration providers 
disclose the name or names of the non-consumer parties to the proceedings, the type of 
dispute involved in the proceedings, who was the prevailing party, whether the non-
consumer party had previously been a party to an arbitration proceeding with the current 
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 See Rakoff, supra note 40, at 1179 (noting that empirical studies have shown that adhesive 
contracts are unlikely to be read by the consumer). 
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 See Cole, supra note 24, at 775-82 (proposing reform to imposed arbitration though the “Due 
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 If such data shows a statistically significant difference in award rates between disputes in a 
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 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2013). 
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However, California law alone will not be sufficient to truly examine trends in 
repeat arbitration.
136
  For such data collection to be complete and successful, it will have 
to be collected not just from California, but from every state.  Therefore, I propose the 
implementation of a nation-wide disclosure law, implemented nationally through 
Congress, and modeled after the California law.
137
   
 The law would require the same disclosures as the California model, and would 
entail publication in a similar manner.  The data collected could then be analyzed for  
evidence of statistical bias or partiality in repeat arbitration.  Specifically, such data 
would allow for a comparison between the rates of success of non-consumer parties in 
mandatory arbitrations, compared to rates of success of non-consumer parties in post-
dispute voluntary submissions. 
The data would also allow for more analysis as to whether businesses shop for 
favorable arbitration proceedings, and how often parties change arbitration providers 
after an unsuccessful arbitration proceeding (as compared to a successful arbitration 
proceeding).  Statistically significant findings here would give support to the notion that 
businesses do shop for the most beneficial arbitration provider, and that arbitration 
providers thereby have incentive to find in favor of the business.  Together, these and 
additional studies would examine whether the use of mandatory arbitration is 
unintentionally biased, actually biased, or whether there is no concern at all to the 
practice. 
In isolation, although a national disclosure law would not independently prevent 
bias or impartiality, it would create a mechanism through which necessary information 
about bias or impartiality could be discovered.
138
  With discovery of such information, I 
believe current FAA provisions would be able to successfully protect consumers against 
potentially biased or partial proceedings regardless of the actual findings.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, it seems clear that, barring a change in philosophy by the Supreme Court, 
or modifications to the FAA by Congress, mandatory consumer arbitration will continue 
to grow in the United States.
139
  Businesses that choose to impose arbitration will 






 See Farmer, supra note 11, at 2368 (“[T]he main problem with California’s disclosure laws . . . is 
that they do not do enough to ensure fairness in arbitration.  California’s program is particularly hamstrung 
by the lack of availability of data from other states, which prevents widespread comparison of arbitration 
providers and restricts the amount of data available for analysis.”). 
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 Id. (“Although commentators have criticized California’s regime for not focusing on certain 
disclosures deemed critical to evaluating the fairness of dispute resolution proceedings, the program has 
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 See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1646-47 (“To date, at least, it seems that the mandatory imposition 
of predispute arbitration on consumers and employees by companies is virtually a uniquely U.S. 
phenomenon.  Indeed, policies issued by the European Union preclude companies from replacing 
consumers’ litigation option with binding arbitration.” (citation omitted)). 
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continue to be able to influence the process on a larger basis than their one-shot 
consumers.  Therefore, in order to protect the less sophisticated consumers from potential 
repeat-player arbitration bias, it is important to facilitate the collection of data that will 
allow study of whether such implementation is actually harming consumers.  
Furthermore, if there is evidence of such harm, the information will allow for the practice 
to be examined and disallowed under FAA Section 10’s prohibition of evident partiality. 
